The influence of employment uncertainty on childbearing in France: A tempo or quantum effect? by Pailhé, Ariane & Solaz, Anne
HAL Id: hal-02081838
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02081838
Submitted on 27 Mar 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
The influence of employment uncertainty on
childbearing in France: A tempo or quantum effect?
Ariane Pailhé, Anne Solaz
To cite this version:
Ariane Pailhé, Anne Solaz. The influence of employment uncertainty on childbearing in France: A
tempo or quantum effect?. Demographic Research, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research,
2012, 26, pp.1-40. ￿10.4054/DemRes.2012.26.1￿. ￿hal-02081838￿
Demographic Research   a free, expedited, online journal 
of peer-reviewed research and commentary  
in the population sciences published by the  
Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research 
Konrad-Zuse Str. 1, D-18057 Rostock · GERMANY 
www.demographic-research.org 
 
 
 
 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH  
 
VOLUME 26, ARTICLE 1, PAGES 1-40  
PUBLISHED 11 JANUARY 2012 
http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol26/1/ 
DOI:  10.4054/DemRes.2012.26.1 
 
Research Article  
 
The influence of employment uncertainty  
on childbearing in France:  
A tempo or quantum effect? 
 
Ariane Pailhé 
Anne Solaz  
 
 
© 2012 Ariane Pailhé & Anne Solaz. 
 
This open-access work is published under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution NonCommercial License 2.0 Germany, which permits use, 
reproduction & distribution in  any medium for non-commercial purposes,  
provided the original author(s) and source are given credit.  
See http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/ 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 1 Introduction 2 
   
2 The French context 4 
2.1 Trends in fertility 4 
2.2 Trends in unemployment 5 
2.3 Trends in non-permanent employment 7 
   
3 Theoretical framework and hypotheses 9 
   
4 Data and method 14 
4.1 Data 14 
4.2 Sample selection 15 
4.3 Empirical strategy 16 
4.4 Several indicators of employment uncertainty 17 
   
5 Results 20 
5.1 Current employment status matters in relation to fertility timing 20 
5.2 Employment uncertainty depends on the period and duration 21 
5.3 Employment uncertainty and educational level 23 
5.4 Aggregate unemployment reduces transition to parenthood 24 
5.5 Completed fertility depends on the accumulation of uncertainty for men 25 
   
6 Discussion and conclusion 29 
   
7 Acknowledgements 31 
   
 References 32 
   
 Appendix 38 
Demographic Research: Volume 26, Article 1 
Research Article 
http://www.demographic-research.org 1 
The influence of employment uncertainty on childbearing in France: 
A tempo or quantum effect? 
Ariane Pailhé1 
Anne Solaz2 
Abstract 
This paper investigates whether unemployment and insecure employment periods 
merely delay fertility or also impact on completed fertility in France. It analyses both 
the timing of first childbearing and the fertility reached at age 40. Different indicators 
of declining employment security are used, i.e., current individual employment 
characteristics, the accumulation of unstable jobs, and aggregate-level indicators of 
employment uncertainty. Male unemployment has a negative influence on the timing of 
first childbearing, while periods of insecure employment delay fertility for women. 
Completed fertility is impacted by unemployment spells only for men who have faced 
long-term unemployment. Employment uncertainty thus tends to delay first parenthood 
but has a relatively weak effect on lifetime fertility in France. Generous state support to 
families associated with a generous unemployment insurance system, and the strong 
French two-child family norm, may explain why economic uncertainty affects fertility 
less than elsewhere.  
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between economic fluctuations and fertility was one of the first topics 
studied in the 16thcentury by demographers and economists. These issues gained 
momentum in the late 18th and 19th centuries with the work of classical economists such 
as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, and Thomas R. Malthus, for whom 
the standard of living had a positive effect on population growth rate. But this theory 
has been challenged by the facts: fertility is lower in rich countries than in poor ones 
and the economic development of Western European countries over the past 150 years 
has been accompanied by a decline in fertility. The theory of fertility that has become a 
dominant paradigm over the last 50 years has tried to solve this paradox by using 
micro-economic models and hypotheses regarding household behaviour (Becker 1981). 
To explain the level of fertility, Gary Becker has stressed the importance of the trade-
off between quantity and “quality” of children, i.e., increasing the quality of children 
leads to a decrease in their quantity. One way to increase the quality of children is to be 
more demanding in terms of fertility conditions, and to wait for particular requirements 
to be satisfied before deciding to become parents. Having a stable job becomes one 
such requirement.  
Since the mid seventies fertility has declined rapidly throughout Europe. Profound 
social changes, such as changes of norms and values and female emancipation, in 
combination with the diffusion of modern contraception, have influenced childbearing 
behaviour (Lesthaeghe 1983). Concomitantly there has been a rise in uncertainty in the 
Western European labour markets. Unemployment and non-permanent employment 
have sharply increased and entering the labour market has become particularly difficult 
for young people. Employment uncertainty has been identified as one of the main 
explanations for postponement of fertility in Europe (Blossfeld et al. 2005; McDonald 
2006). In a context of declining employment security and increasing unemployment the 
cost of having children may be perceived as higher, and young people may wait until 
they hold a permanent job before entering into parenthood (Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 
2006; Adsera 2004). 
The empirical literature based on individual data usually finds that unemployment 
delays the formation of a family. Until now research on the impact of employment 
uncertainty on fertility has mainly focused on women. Some contrasting results have 
been found on the link between fertility and female unemployment, depending on the 
country covered. The longitudinal analysis conducted by Adsera (2005a) on a sample of 
13 Western European countries has shown that childbearing postponement is significant 
in countries with high and persistent unemployment.  Unemployment accelerates entry 
into motherhood in Northern countries (Kravdal 1994, 2002; Hoem 2000; Andersson 
2000), Germany, and the United Kingdom (Schmitt 2008), while it postpones it in 
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http://www.demographic-research.org 3 
continental countries such as Belgian Flanders (Impens 1989) and France (Meron, 
Widmer and Shapiro 2002). These contrasting results may be explained by country-
specific effects, particularly differences in social welfare and unemployment protection. 
They may also stem from the role of men’s employment situation, which has rarely 
been analysed. Few studies have investigated the impact of male unemployment, but all 
have highlighted that men’s unemployment has a more pronounced negative effect than 
that of women (Kravdal 2002 for Norway; Lundström 2009 for Sweden; Tölke and 
Diewald 2003 and Özcan, Mayer and Luedicke 2010 for Germany; Mills, Blossfeld and 
Klijzing 2005 for 14 industrialised countries). 
Beyond unemployment, the question of the impact of non-permanent employment 
has been raised only recently. Studies have mainly covered southern European 
countries, where these types of atypical employment are particularly widespread. They 
have confirmed the hypothesis that fertility is postponed when the employment time 
horizon is short (de la Rica and Iza 2005; Ahn and Mira 2001).  
Most of the papers addressing the effect of employment uncertainty on fertility 
focus on the timing of childbearing. Indeed, the rising age at childbearing is considered 
as one of the main explanations for the decrease in fertility (Morgan 2003; Bongaarts 
2001; Bongaarts and Feeney 1998; Caldwell and Schindlmayr 2003). In other words, 
“timing and numbers are interrelated” (Morgan and Taylor 2006). However, the 
demographic trends in France do not follow the suggested pattern, i.e., that delayed 
entry into parenthood results in lower fertility (Toulemon, Pailhé and Rossier 2008). As 
elsewhere in Western Europe, entry into parenthood has been delayed in France, but 
cohort completed fertility has remained close to the replacement level. The fertility 
level remains high despite a negative relationship between fertility trends and 
unemployment. Thus, among continental European countries, France has a particular 
position since it combines high fertility, increasing age at first birth, high youth 
unemployment, and non-permanent employment. This raises the question of the specific 
impact of employment uncertainty in France compared to the other European countries. 
Do unemployment and non-permanent employment affect fertility in France less than 
elsewhere in Europe? Do they merely delay fertility or also impact on completed 
fertility? In other words, does employment uncertainty have a tempo or quantum effect 
on childbearing in France? 
This paper analyses the effect of employment uncertainty on fertility behaviour in 
France. It analyses both the timing of first childbearing and the fertility reached at age 
40, using a French representative survey, the Enquête Familles et Employeurs (Families 
and Employers survey, EFE hereafter). The impact of both male and female 
employment situations will receive attention, since both may influence fertility. 
Different indicators of employment uncertainty are used to address this question, i.e., 
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current individual employment characteristics, accumulation of short-term employment 
over the life course, and aggregate-level indicators of employment uncertainty.  
The paper is organised as follows. First, the French context of fertility and 
employment is outlined. The second section describes the theoretical background. The 
data and methods are presented in the third section. The last section details the results 
on both timing of fertility and completed fertility. 
 
 
2. The French context 
2.1 Trends in fertility 
As elsewhere in Europe, entry into parenthood is increasingly delayed and the timing of 
fertility is changing rapidly. The fertility schedule is moving continuously to higher 
ages and the mean age at childbirth is continuing to rise. The mean age at first 
childbirth has increased since the mid-1970s, rising from 23.9 years in 1975 to 27.8 
years in 2006. This increase results both from a decrease in fertility at young ages 
(before 25) and an increase at ages 28 and over (Insee, bilan démographique). 
However, unlike the other European countries, this postponement seems to have 
little impact on completed fertility. France is one of Europe’s most fertile countries. In 
2008, with 1.99 children per woman on average, France ranked second in Europe, 
behind Ireland (2.10). From the beginning of the 1960s fertility in France followed a 
similar trend to that observed in other European countries. The total fertility rate (TFR) 
decreased from 2.5 children per woman in 1970 to below 2 in 1975 (Figure 1). It 
stabilized in the 1980s and reached its lowest level in 1994 (1.66), during the economic 
downturn of the mid-90s. As in other European countries there was a negative 
relationship between fertility and unemployment. But since the end of the 1990s France 
has broken away from its neighbours: fertility began to increase clearly from 1996, and 
the period total fertility rate has remained stable at above 1.9 since 2000. The recent 
economic crisis has had no negative effect on fertility: the number of births continued to 
increase in 2010 and the TFR reached 2.00 children per woman (Pison 2011). The 
cohort total fertility has fallen slightly but levelled off at 2.0 (Figure 1). In metropolitan 
France, women born in 1957, who turned 50 in 2007, have had 2.14 children on average 
(Toulemon et al. 2008).  
The proportion of childless women has remained very low: only 11% of women 
born in 1970 will remain childless and “the probability of a progression to a second, a 
third and a fourth child has not changed since 1975” (Toulemon, Pailhé and Rossier 
2008). All in all, a higher proportion of women give birth to a first child in France than 
in other European countries, and likewise for second and third births (Prioux 2005). 
Demographic Research: Volume 26, Article 1 
Finally, the two-child family is the norm (Regnier-Loilier 2006): 41% of women born 
in 1960 have two children. 
 
Figure 1: Fertility since 1970 in France 
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Source: Toulemon et al. 2008 (data from Insee, register data) 
 
A noticeable characteristic of French fertility is its homogeneity by education level 
and social class. The most educated women have fewer children than the least educated 
women(1.85 and 2.42 children respectively, on average, among the female cohorts born 
in 1955-59), but the differences are small compared with other European countries 
where there is much greater polarization by education level (Ekert-Jaffé et al. 2002). 
Another significant feature is the small numbers of births outside a partnership: only 
7% of mothers are living alone at the time of birth (Vilain et al. 2005).  
 
 
2.2 Trends in unemployment 
Since the mid-1970s France has experienced a dramatic increase in unemployment due 
to a slowdown in economic growth: the unemployment rate (according to the ILO 
definition) of persons aged 15-64 increased from 3.5% in 1975 to 7.8% in 2008, after 
reaching record levels (10.8%) in 1994 and again in 1997. The unemployment rate is 
fairly high in France compared to other European countries. In 2008 it was the fourth 
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highest in Europe (behind Spain, Slovakia, and Hungary), and above the EU-27 average 
(7.0%). Fluctuating widely in response to economic conditions, it exceeded 20% for the 
20-24 age group during periods of economic slowdown in the mid-1980s, 1990s, and 
2000s, and has never fallen below 15% since the mid-1980s (Figure 2). For the 25-29 
age group, it has remained above 10% since 1985 (with the only exception of 2008) and 
topped 15% during the economic downturn of the 1990s. Young people with lower 
levels of educational attainment have been particularly hard-hit (Fondeur and Minni 
2005).  
Another specific feature of unemployment in France is its long duration. The 
average length is more than one year (14 months in 2006): 40% of unemployed people 
have been out of work for at least one year, 21% for at least 2 years. Flows from 
unemployment to employment are rather low: according to LFS data, the likelihood of 
finding employment in 2007 if unemployed in 2006 was 34%. Long-term 
unemployment mainly concerns persons aged 50 and over. However, a significant share 
of young people is at risk of long-term joblessness, with25.8% of youth unemployed 
remaining out of work for a year or more in 2006 (26.8% of men, 24.6% of women).  
People who have involuntarily lost their jobs are covered by the unemployment 
insurance scheme, on condition that they have worked at least 4 months in the last 22 
months, that they are registered as a jobseeker, and are in the process of genuinely and 
actively seeking employment. The amount of benefit is calculated on the basis of 
previous earnings.3 Unemployment benefits can be claimed for a period equal to the 
duration of former employment, with a maximum of 24 months. Thus, school-leavers 
are not eligible for unemployment benefits unless they have worked for a sufficiently 
long period. From age 25 they are entitled to the minimum welfare benefit.  
A person with social protection prior to unemployment continues to benefit from 
health insurance (covering illness, maternity, and death) as long as he/she is entitled to 
unemployment benefit. Like working people, unemployed people are also entitled to 
universal and means-tested family benefits. With at least one child under 3 they can get 
a basic allowance (a one-off payment per birth of €890, and €178 per month for 3 
years). Universal family benefits are also available, but only from the second child 
(€124 per month for 2 children, €283 for 3 children). Unemployed people are also 
entitled to the parental leave allowance (€374 per month until the child’s third birthday, 
from the second child since 1994). Since entitlement to childcare services is linked to 
                                                          
3 In 2010, the amount of benefit equaled 57.4% of gross daily earnings if monthly gross earnings were 
between €1,791.18 and €9,728; 40.4 % of gross daily earnings + €10.15 per day if monthly gross earnings 
were between €1,791.18 and €9,728, and €1,791.18; €24.76 per day if monthly gross earnings were between 
€990.40  and €1,084.90. If monthly gross earnings were under €990.40, the benefit equaled 75 % of the gross 
monthly wage. 
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employment status, unemployed parents can theoretically benefit from daycare centres, 
whose fees are means-tested, but they do not have priority. 
 
Figure 2: Unemployment rate by age-group 
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Source: Eurostat, Labour force surveys, 1983-2009 
 
 
2.3 Trends in non-permanent employment 
Non-permanent employment has grown, despite strict regulations on temporary forms 
of employment.4 These contracts must be restricted to ‘objective’ situations 
(replacement, seasonal work, temporary increases in company activity, training 
purposes, public works programmes) and the number of successive fixed-term contracts 
for the same person within the same company is limited. Such contracts also have a 
fixed duration of 3 to 18 months,5 and can be renewed only twice within the same 
company. Despite this protective regulation, use of this type of contract has regularly 
increased, especially but not exclusively for young people entering the labour market 
(Figure 3). Since the mid-1990s more than four in ten employment contracts of 
employees aged 20-24 and about two in ten contracts of those aged 25-29 have been 
fixed-term contracts. 
                                                          
4 Since the late 1970s a succession of formal regulations have been introduced to restrict fixed-term contracts 
to contracts of short-term duration, to limit the permissible grounds for their use and to establish a degree of 
equality of treatment between employees hired under such contracts and other employees. 
5 In some restricted cases it may be 24 months. In the public sector it may be 6 years for highly qualified 
people. 
http://www.demographic-research.org 7 
Pailhé & Solaz: The influence of employment uncertainty on childbearing in France 
Like employees on an open-ended contract, employees on fixed-term contracts are 
eligible for unemployment benefit, as well as parental leave and parental leave benefit, 
on condition that they have paid social security contributions over a long enough 
period. Such employment protection for people on temporary contracts is quite 
generous in France compared to other European countries (Venn 2009). 
 
Figure 3: Share of temporary employment among employees, by age % 
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This overview of employment trends in France shows that levels of unemployment 
and flexible forms of employment are fairly high for young people in France compared 
to other European countries. Since conditions at labour market entry up to age 30 are 
likely to strongly influence the later career, their working lives are less continuous. 
Transitions into and out of unemployment have increased (Germe, Montchatre and 
Pottier 2003) for all categories of employees, but especially the unskilled, leading to a 
growing contrast between employees with a stable position in their firm and individuals 
engaged in frequent transitions in and out of employment. Moreover, the gap between 
cohorts has widened: cohorts born after 1955 have faced rising unemployment, while 
those born after 1965 have also experienced the deregulation of the labour market and 
the rise in non-permanent employment. 
These profound changes in the labour market have progressively led to an 
increased climate of uncertainty in France (Castel 2009). Even though unemployed 
people benefit from welfare protection, they experience a drop in income. Moreover, 
the perceived employment uncertainty is large for persons with an insecure status, such 
as a fixed-term contract, or who are unemployed (Alibert, Bigot and Foucaud. 2006). 
The high level of long-term unemployment contributes to maintaining this uncertainty. 
In addition there may be a stigma associated with unemployment or non-permanent 
  http://www.demographic-research.org 8 
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employment, since these statuses are not the social norm (Bourguignon and Herman 
2007).6 These developments can be expected to have a spillover effect on individual 
decisions in private life, and particularly on family formation. This article addresses 
whether these two forms of employment uncertainty, i.e., unemployment and non-
permanent employment, have similar impacts on fertility decisions. It analyses their 
impact on fertility decisions for men and women in partnership,7 but not their effect on 
the propensity and timing of partnership formation.8 We assume in this research that the 
risk of childbirth occurs once people are in partnership, and we focus specifically on 
them. 
 
 
3. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Economists have developed models to explain how fertility might respond to variations 
of income. The dominant economic approach to fertility was developed by Gary Becker 
(1981), who explained the negative relationship between income growth and fertility by 
introducing the concept of child "quality", i.e., that parents have a demand for quality as 
well as quantity of children. The higher the income, the higher the demand for child 
quality, and the lower the quantity. As is common in the literature (Kravdal 1994; 
Adsera 2005b; De la Rica and Iza 2005; Kreyenfeld 2005), this argument of the effect 
of a variation in income can be adapted to employment uncertainty, i.e., unemployment 
or non-permanent employment, since it involves a decrease in income and/or an 
uncertain future income. As men and women do not hold the same position in the 
family and in employment, we expect the effects of job insecurity to differ by gender. 
We will first present the general mechanisms of the theory and then discuss the gender 
differences in the effects of employment uncertainty on fertility. 
                                                          
6 Even if in some cases short-term employment is an individual choice, in the majority of cases it is 
involuntary. In a context of growing employment uncertainty, young workers, especially when they live in 
partnership and intend to start a family, look for job security (Bourguignon and Herman 2007). 
7 Births outside a partnership are rare in France and often unplanned. The proportion of unplanned births is 
estimated at around 5% after age 20, but is significantly higher at very young ages (13% before 20) or when 
women are out of partnership (Regnier-Loilier and Solaz 2010).  
8 Employment instability may cause a postponement of other decisions that are irreversible and involve the 
long term. In particular, the social crisis may encourage young people to stay in school and to delay marriage. 
This postponement of completion of education may also affect the number of births in the longer term, the 
most educated people having fewer children. A social crisis may indirectly play on births by deregulating the 
“marriage market”, because men with low income or an unstable job are less “attractive” (Oppenheimer 
1994). These phenomena are beyond the scope of our paper, but should be kept in mind when interpreting our 
results. 
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The starting point of the analysis is that the parents’ fertility decision depends on 
trade-offs between the costs and benefits of children. These costs can be monetary but 
can also take the form of investment in time. An increase in income (or expected 
income) has two opposite effects. On the one hand, the increase in household income 
raises the demand for children (income effect). On the other hand, it represents an 
increase in the price of time spent with children – the income or career opportunities 
that a parent must give up to care for the child – and thus may reduce the demand for 
children (price effect). As the relative importance of these two effects may vary, one 
cannot, in theory, determine which of the two effects dominates. However, for Gary 
Becker, as income rises the demand for quality rises more rapidly than the demand for 
quantity: in other words, households have fewer children and invest more in each child.  
Both income and price effects play symmetrically in time of crisis. A recession 
may lead to a decline in household income, for example if one member becomes 
unemployed, compressing the demand for quantity of children when the demand for 
child quality is constant. Postponing childbearing may be a way to save resources 
otherwise spent on the child, providing a means to offset the financial losses arising 
from unemployment. This postponement may also reflect unemployed individuals’ 
anticipation of greater difficulties in finding a new job after becoming parents. 
Conversely, the opportunity cost (or price effect) of children is lower when 
unemployed. Moreover, having a child while unemployed may save childcare costs. In 
other words, it may be relatively less expensive to have a child when being unemployed 
than when working. Again, as in the case of income growth, one cannot predict ex ante 
which effect prevails.  
Such reasoning may apply not only to current unemployment but also to persons 
who anticipate unemployment or are at risk of losing their job, particularly those in 
insecure employment. One can argue that the income effect is attenuated for people in 
non-permanent employment compared to unemployed people since their current income 
is likely to be higher. The income effect will depend both on their current income and 
on their expected future income, i.e., on their anticipated chances of remaining in 
employment or of getting a permanent job. But since they can claim unemployment 
benefits after the contract ends, their future income is more certain than that of 
unemployed people. On the other hand, since they are employed, the opportunity cost of 
being a parent is higher for people in non-permanent employment compared to 
unemployed people, given the high level of foregone income in the case of work 
interruption for childrearing. It may also be even higher than for people in permanent 
employment, since remaining in employment may prove their commitment to work, and 
thus increase their chances of getting a permanent contract. If people anticipate greater 
difficulties in finding a new job after becoming a parent they will postpone 
childbearing. 
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The sociological approaches also highlight the adverse effects that the financial 
crisis may have on fertility decisions. Being in employment or attaining a status 
considered appropriate in individual careers may be a precondition for family formation 
or the birth of an additional child, providing a means to ensure social status and secure 
current and future economic resources. In a context of strong normative pressure 
regarding employment, this effect may be particularly strong. It is expected to be 
stronger for men if traditional gender roles prevail, i.e., if men are expected to be the 
main breadwinner. However, Débra Friedman, Hechter and Kanazawa (1994) argue 
that people facing various different types of economic uncertainty might actually decide 
to have children. In the same vein, Edin and Kefalas (2005) show that the poorest 
women in non-permanent employment may decide to have a child before marriage 
because entry into motherhood may increase their social status.  For those with little 
control over their economic situation having children can be a strategy to reduce 
uncertainty, the private sphere seeming less uncertain than the public sphere: when the 
work situation or the economic environment is uncertain, becoming a parent can be a 
way to make the future safer. This explanation is particularly true in contexts where 
fertility is valued or where the time demands of work are in conflict with family 
formation, particularly because of a shortage of public childcare. 
Both these economic and sociological theoretical aspects suggest that the effect of 
unemployment or non-permanent employment may differ by gender. In countries where 
the male breadwinner model dominates, it is more important for men than for women to 
establish themselves professionally before having a child (Oppenheimer et al. 1997). 
From an economic point of view, as men are generally the main breadwinner, the 
income effect should be higher than the price effect for men, thereby reducing the 
demand for children (Özcan, Mayer and Luedicke 2010). The variations of the price of 
children with income are usually higher for women than for men, since they are still the 
main childcare provider (Galor and Weil 1996; Pailhé and Solaz 2008). Since a 
decrease in women’s individual income reduces both the household income and the 
price of children, the income effect may be offset by the price effect. From a 
sociological point of view the family sphere is more valued for women than men 
because of gendered social norms. Indeed, according to the role theory, women receive 
substantial social rewards when they participate in mothering, while men receive far 
fewer such rewards for fathering (Van der Lippe 1994). Moreover, according to the 
‘doing gender’ approach, the greater involvement of women in housework and men in 
market work is a way of reaffirming their gender identities (Goffman 1977). Thus, male 
unemployment should have a higher impact on fertility than female unemployment 
(Kravdal 2002).  
On the other hand, the opportunity cost of childbearing may be particularly high 
for women in non-permanent employment. Indeed, having one child affects the chances 
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of obtaining a long-term contract much more strongly for women than for men, 
particularly if having a child is interpreted by the employer as a weakening of 
commitment to work and if childcare provision is poor. Non-permanent employment 
and unemployment may affect the timing of childbearing in different ways. 
 
Thus, we pose the following hypotheses: 
 
H1a: For men, unemployment delays the transition to fatherhood.  
         For women, the sign of the effect is undetermined. 
H1b: For men, the negative impact of non-permanent employment is expected to  
        be lower than that of unemployment. For women, the impact of short-term  
        employment is likely to be negative and stronger than that of unemployment. 
 
But the impact of employment uncertainty depends on its timing and on its 
duration. One can expect the impact to differ if it occurs at the beginning of the union, 
or later on. For example, Meron, Widmer and Shapiro (2002) showed that French 
women in short-term employment in the year they started their union postpone the birth 
of their first child. If people feel ready to form a union while exposed to employment 
uncertainty they are already aware of this risk at the outset, but decide to go ahead 
anyway. These people who start a union while one partner is unemployed might be 
selected, since people who experience uncertainty usually postpone partnership 
formation (Ekert-Jaffé and Solaz 2001). They might be less risk-averse in a context of 
economic uncertainty and might accept employment uncertainty more readily. By 
contrast, employment uncertainty that occurs later may be more destabilising for 
fertility decisions. These unanticipated changes in economic circumstances may affect 
the birth of children. Indeed, like the so-called “surprise effect” defined by Weiss and 
Willis (1997) in the case of divorce,9 an unanticipated unemployment spell may affect 
the couple’s childbearing behaviour, all the more if one partner is more risk-averse than 
the other. 
Moreover, the impact of employment uncertainty depends on its duration (Özcan, 
Mayer and Luedicke 2010). A persistent period of unemployment is expected to have a 
strong negative effect on childbearing (Adsera 2004). However, in the case of 
permanent uncertainty households may re-evaluate their preferences, such as their 
material aspirations and child quality requirements, and review the decision whether to 
have a child or to postpone childbirth even further (Kravdal 2002). Since childbearing is 
an alternative to employment for women much more than for men, women may re-
                                                          
9 They analyse the effect of these “surprises” (difference between predicted and observed value of earnings) 
on the probability of divorce.  
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evaluate their preferences much sooner than men in the case of long-term 
unemployment, and decide to centre their lives on the private sphere. We can thus 
formulate our second hypothesis: 
 
H2a: Economic uncertainty has a weaker effect in delaying the transition  
         to parenthood when it is accepted, i.e., when it occurs at couple formation. 
H2b: Economic uncertainty has a stronger effect when persistent, especially for men. 
 
The effect of employment uncertainty may operate differently according to 
educational level. One can assume that the income effect is stronger for highly educated 
men and women and thus encourages postponement of childbearing, while less 
educated persons will accelerate the transition to parenthood. Highly educated women, 
giving priority to their career, may intend to get a stable job before becoming mothers, 
unlike those who have less control over their economic situation and who give priority 
to family, and who may take the opportunity of being unemployed to accelerate 
childbearing. Since for men getting a job is important for gaining social status, 
whatever their level of education, one can expect men’s behaviours to differ much less 
according to level of education than women’s. This leads to our third hypothesis: 
 
H3: Highly educated women are expected to postpone childbearing much more  
       than less educated women when facing unemployment.  
       The impact of education for men is lower. 
 
Beyond the individual situation, the aggregate unemployment rate may also affect 
fertility desires and decisions, via individuals’ confidence in the future. A higher 
unemployment rate may impact those who remain in work via a more pessimistic 
perception of their own future employment prospects. For instance, De Witte (1999) has 
emphasized that anticipating redundancy is at least as distressing for individuals as the 
experience of unemployment itself. Several studies have shown that aggregate-level 
factors influence the timing of childbearing above individual employment 
characteristics (Santow and Bracher 2001; Kravdal 2002). An opposite mechanism, 
mentioned by Kravdal (2002), might positively link unemployment rate and fertility. 
Aggregate unemployment, when high and chronic, tends to depress wages overall and 
might decrease labour market participation. In France, however, wage stability is 
guaranteed by labour market regulations, and in particular the existence of a minimum 
wage, so we assume that this effect will be of very limited magnitude. General 
economic insecurity may thus give rise to a waiting period during which long-term 
choices such as fertility decisions are postponed. Thus we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
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H4: The higher the aggregate unemployment rate, the longer people wait  
       before having a child. 
 
The long-term implications of such employment uncertainty are not obvious 
(Bhaumik and Nugent 2005). If employment uncertainty is temporary, individuals may 
have the desired number of children over the rest of their lifetime. But uncertainty 
might affect completed fertility if employment uncertainty were to persist over a long 
period of time, such that childbirth is postponed a number of times. However, 
individuals may re-evaluate their preferences and centre their life on family. Thus, the 
impact of employment uncertainty on completed fertility is theoretically undetermined: 
it is important to measure the influence of the duration of periods of unemployment and 
non-permanent employment over the life course to assess this effect. 
 
H5: The long-term implications of employment uncertainty are undetermined  
       and depend on the recurrence of uncertainty over the life cycle. 
 
 
4. Data and method 
4.1 Data 
The data set used here comes from the Familles et Employeurs survey conducted by the 
French National Institute of Demographic Studies (INED) on a representative sample of 
the French population from November 2004 to March 2005. The sample comprises 
9,547 individuals (5,107 women and 4,440 men) aged 20-49. Two persons per 
household in the age range were interviewed.  
The data contains standard socio-demographic information (education, household 
type, number of children, region of residence, health status, immigrant status, etc.) and, 
for those employed at the time of interview, detailed information on current job 
characteristics. This survey also includes retrospective individual biographical data 
concerning family residential and employment history from the age of 18: individual 
employment history was recorded via a computerized grid on a yearly basis. Six 
employment statuses were proposed: employment - distinguishing between part-time 
and full-time work, unemployment, education or training, military service, inactivity. 
Respondents were asked to indicate the years of occurrence of each employment status 
lasting at least six months. An additional “status” was proposed to take into account 
short spells of employment or non-employment, i.e., less than six months. Thus non-
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permanent employment is defined as a period of employment lasting less than six 
months.10 More than one situation can be identified for a given year: firstly, some 
situations are not exclusive (for example, education and unemployment); secondly, a 
six month period can start at year t and end at year t+1 (the interviewers were instructed 
to tick the two years). Moreover, for each family event reported (union formation, 
childbearing), the individual was asked about a precise definition of his/her 
employment situation (wage-earner/self-employed, public/ private employment, type of 
contract). In this respect this survey is unique as a source of information for analysing 
the interaction between employment patterns and fertility decisions.  
 
 
4.2 Sample selection 
Since we assume that the risk of childbirth occurs once people are in partnership, we 
study the impact of employment instability on men and women in their first partnership 
(married or not). Different sub-samples relevant to the study topic are used, each one 
divided into men and women.  
First, all women and men who have already formed a union11 are selected to test 
our four first hypotheses, i.e., to study the timing of the first birth. People having given 
birth before their first partnership are not taken into account since we concentrate on the 
timing of fertility after partnership.12This sample contains 7,991 observations (3,533 
men and 4,358 women). The mean duration between union formation and the first 
birth13 is three years and two months. Most first births occur in the first five years 
following union formation (63% of couples already have their first child after five years 
of partnership). After ten years of union only 12% of couples are still childless and the 
risk of childbearing is very low.  
Second, to test our fifth hypothesis, i.e., to study completed fertility, the sample is 
restricted to individuals who have already formed a union and are at least 40 years old 
at the date of the survey. This age limit is defined in order to focus on people who are 
assumed to have completed their fertility. Indeed, in France female fertility is low after 
age 40.14 Male fertility may not be completed, but the same age limit is chosen to 
                                                          
 
10 The aim of this restriction in the duration of non-permanent employment is to focus on the most uncertain 
types of short-term employment and to eliminate trial periods that usually turn into permanent employment. 
11 Union is defined as cohabiting for at least six months. 
12Only 125 individuals are excluded. 
13 Pregnant women are not included since the outcome of pregnancy is not sure and a couple may split up 
during pregnancy. 
14 In 2004 the age-specific fertility rate, i.e., the number of births per 100 women over a given age range, was 
6.4 per 100 women aged 40 and over, against 64.3 per 100 women aged 25-29, and 60.4 per 100women aged 
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ensure consistency and to ensure a large number of observations. This sample of 
completed fertility contains 3,316 observations (1,534 men and 1,782 women). 
 
 
4.3 Empirical strategy 
The effect of economic uncertainty on the timing of first childbearing is estimated 
through Cox proportional hazards models (Cox 1972). These models are estimated 
separately for childless men and women. The dependent variable is the transition to first 
birth. Childless people are followed from the start of the union and right-censored at the 
date of interview or at the union dissolution date. In order to analyse the effect of 
unemployment and short-term employment on the level of fertility an ordered 
polytomic model is estimated. The dependent variable is the number of children 
individuals have had near the end of their reproductive life, i.e., at age 40. Above four 
children, the modalities are grouped together.  
In all these models the same set of control covariates is used.15 The level of 
education is introduced with four dummy variables: no education, low education 
(primary), medium level education (secondary), and high education (university). Three 
birth cohorts are distinguished: born in 1955-1964, in 1965-1974, and in 1975-1986. 
The age at first union formation is added, since it is usually a good indicator of the 
quality of the partnership match. Couples formed very young usually have a higher risk 
of dissolution and hence a lower risk of having children. Marital status is also included, 
since the formalization of the union may be a pre-condition for having children. Some 
background variables are also introduced, since individuals may adhere to behaviour, 
values, and norms that dominated during their childhood. Characteristics of the family 
of origin include whether the respondent has at least two siblings, and an indicator of 
immigrant background, separating French natives from second generation and 
immigrants. Having grown up in a large family is usually a good determinant and 
positively correlated to the family size reached since it may indicate that the respondent 
was raised in a family with strong family values (Michaël and Tuma 1985). Immigrant 
fertility is also higher than that of native French people. Moreover, fertility varies by 
immigrant generation, with significant declines between the first and subsequent 
generations. An additional indicator of the cultural context is introduced through the 
individual’s religiosity, i.e., if the respondent reported that religion is important in 
his/her daily life. Two additional variables which summarize marital life, i.e., number 
                                                                                                                                             
30-34 [Insee, Bilan démographique]. In our sample fewer than 7% of men and 2% of women had children 
after age 40. 
15 These covariates are added one set at a time. 
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of years in partnership and the number of partnerships, are added in the regressions for 
completed fertility at age 40. 
 
 
4.4 Several indicators of employment uncertainty 
We build a number of key explanatory variables measuring different aspects of 
employment uncertainty in order to test our different hypotheses. In order to analyse the 
impact of current uncertain employment status on the timing of fertility, the current 
status – whether the respondent is in long-term employment, short-term employment, or 
is unemployed (or a homemaker for women) – is computed for each calendar year.16 
This time-dependent variable is lagged by one year to take into account the time to 
conceive and the duration of the pregnancy (model specification 1 in Table 2).  
The graphs in Figure 4 represent the frequencies of being unemployed or in short-
term employment in our sample by age.17 These curves first show that a large share of 
the respondents has been unemployed over the life course (about 4-5% of the sample at 
each age). Second, they show that unemployment risk decreases with age but remains 
significant after age 30.18 Third, the gender discrepancy is high: women are much more 
likely to face unemployment. There is also a cohort effect: the birth cohort born after 
1964 experienced higher unemployment than the previous cohorts. The percentage of 
men and women in short-term employment is much higher than the percentage that is 
unemployed, especially under age 26. With regard to short-term employment, the 
gender gap is almost invisible except at the beginning of the life course, when women 
are more affected than men. On the other hand, the cohort gap is even larger than for 
unemployment. This figure confirms that the rise of precarious contracts has massively 
affected the cohorts born after1964.  
 
                                                          
16 Unfortunately, unemployment and employment lasting less than six months cannot be separated in the 
employment calendar. Like Meron, Widmer and Shapiro (2002) we consider these insecure periods as short-
term jobs.  
17 The curves of unemployment frequencies do not describe the unemployment rate, since the denominator 
includes the entire sample (people aged 20-49 in 2004 having formed at least one union) and not the working 
population. 
18 The effect is probably weaker in our sample than in the general population because only the young people 
who have already formed a partnership are considered. 
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Figure 4: Frequencies of unemployment/ short-term employment by age, sex, 
and birth cohort 
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Source: EFE, INED, 2004-2005 
 
In order to test our hypothesis H2a, i.e., the effect of unemployment uncertainty 
depends on the moment such events occur over the life course, we analyse the impact of 
employment status at the time of union formation on the timing of fertility (model 
specification 2 of Table 2). The information regarding employment status at entry into 
union is available from the answer to the question “At the beginning of this/your first 
partnership, in year, were you … 
 
1  working? 
2  in national service? 
3  unemployed? 
4  in school, higher education, unpaid training? 
5  a homemaker or in another inactive situation?” 
 
Table 1 displays the employment status of respondents at entry into union. The 
large majority of respondents, 81% of men and 62% of women, are in work.19 They are 
rarely unemployed, and men are less often unemployed than women (resp. 3.4% and 
6.3%) since they may wait to find a job before forming a union (Ekert-Jaffé and Solaz 
2001). A quite significant proportion of respondents (10.2% of men and 19% of 
women) are students at the time of first union formation. Few persons start their union 
                                                          
19Unfortunately the EFE survey does not distinguish between permanent or non-permanent employment at 
this stage. 
  http://www.demographic-research.org 18 
Demographic Research: Volume 26, Article 1 
http://www.demographic-research.org 19
during their compulsory national service, so they are grouped with students in the 
analysis. 
 
Table 1: Employment status at entry into first union (%) 
 Men Women 
Working 81.2 62.3 
In national service 3.6 0.1 
Unemployed 3.4 6.3 
Student 10.2 19.1 
Homemaker or in another inactive situation 1.6 12.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: EFE, INED, 2004-2005 
 
A third indicator aims to test our hypothesis H2b. It measures the influence of the 
accumulation of employment uncertainty over the life course on the childbearing 
process. For this purpose a time-varying variable for the ratio of the number of years 
with unemployment spells to the number of years since union formation is computed.20 
A ratio is computed instead of a simple duration in unemployment, as the longer the 
duration since partnership formation, the higher the likelihood of having experienced 
unemployment. The same types of longitudinal indicators are built for spells of short-
term employment and inactivity.21 
In order to test our hypothesis H3, i.e., whether behaviours are related to 
educational level, we added interaction terms between the indicator of employment 
uncertainty (employment status the previous year) and the woman’s level of education. 
To assess whether the timing of childbearing is responsive to both individual and 
societal circumstances (H4), models that incorporate both individual-level and 
aggregate-level data are constructed. These aggregate-level indicators, such as the local 
unemployment level or the country unemployment rate, may reflect the perceived risk 
of unemployment. Thus, the national unemployment rate of men (resp. women) aged 
15-64 is introduced in the male (resp. female) specification (model specification 4 of 
Table 2). 
Finally, to answer hypothesis H5 we analyse completed fertility at age 40, using 
the same kind of life-cycle ratios of short-term employment and unemployment spells. 
They describe, in this case, the proportion of time spent in insecure employment over 
                                                          
20 We also tried another specification of the ratios, which included the insecure employment or unemployment 
spells occurring before partnership formation and since the completion of education. 
21 When several situations were identified in the same year, we divided the year by the number of situations 
identified and attributed to each situation a duration equal to the corresponding fraction of year. 
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the period starting from first union formation and finishing at the fortieth birthday. In an 
alternative specification this ratio is categorized according to three dummy variables 
contrasting those with a ratio equal to 0, under 10%, or over 10% (Table 4). Table A1 
shows the frequencies of these life-cycle ratios for unemployment: 9.8% of men and 
16.9% of women were unemployed (for spells exceeding six months) for more than one 
year in ten over this period; 7.4% of men and 13.1% of women spent less than 10% of 
the years since first union formation in unemployment. The majority of the population, 
i.e., 82.8% of men and 70.0% of women, had no such unemployment spells. We 
observe the same gender gap in life-cycle ratios for short-term employment spells, with 
14.1% of women having spent one year in ten in short-term employment, versus only 
10.6% of men.  
 
 
5. Results 
Childbearing is linked with employment uncertainty, though this does not hold for all 
our indicators of uncertainty. Table 2 displays the hazard ratio for our key explanatory 
variables. Table A2 gives complete results from the Cox regression for specification 1 
of Table 2.  
Our results are not pure causal effects, since in these models we control for several 
observables covariates, and some other unobserved factors might influence both fertility 
and labour market status and there might be some selection of persons facing 
unemployment and job insecurity. However, as the unemployment rate in France has 
been high for several decades, this selection effect should be somewhat lower than in 
countries with only frictional –and therefore more voluntary– unemployment.  
 
 
5.1 Current employment status matters in relation to fertility timing  
After controlling for cohort, education, religiosity, age at union formation, and number 
of siblings, it appears that being unemployed or in short-term employment one year 
earlier delays the first child for men (specification 1, Table 2). This result suggests that, 
for men, the income effect of unemployment is higher than the reduction of the 
opportunity cost of children, at least regarding unemployment. For women, 
unemployment has no such effect, neither accelerating nor delaying pregnancy. In other 
words, women do not take advantage of unemployment to have children, and neither do 
they wait to be employed. Thus our first hypothesis (H1a), whereby unemployment is 
negatively related to the demand for children, is validated for men. Hypothesis H1a also 
suggested that unemployment has no clear effect on the timing of motherhood. At this 
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stage of the analysis it seems that for women income and price effects counterbalance 
each other. 
The timing of childbearing reacts to non-permanent employment in a different 
way. Holding an insecure job postpones transition to motherhood. Thus, once they get 
such a job, women wait for a stable job situation before founding a family. It seems that 
women in short-term employment anticipate greater difficulties in keeping their job or 
finding a new one after becoming a mother, and thus postpone childbearing. On the 
other hand, short-term employment is not significant in the timing of fatherhood. Thus 
our hypothesis H1b is validated: the impact of short-term employment is negative and 
stronger than unemployment for women, and weaker for men. 
 
 
5.2 Employment uncertainty depends on the period and duration 
Unemployment at the time of entry into union matters very little for the timing of 
childbearing (specification 2, Table 2).22 Being unemployed at union formation does 
not affect future fertility timing. This result suggests that people having already faced 
unemployment at the time of union formation are highly selected and do not feel more 
cautious and sensitive to later unemployment risk. Inactive women still bring forward 
births, while being in education delays the start of a family for both men and women. 
While unemployment at the beginning of partnership is not significant for the timing of 
childbearing, we have seen in section 4.1 that unemployment occurring after couple 
formation matters for men. Thus our hypothesis H2a is validated for men: economic 
uncertainty has no effect when it is accepted, i.e., when it occurs at couple formation. It 
has a stronger effect when it is unexpected. 
Our hypothesis H2b stated that the effects of employment uncertainty depend on 
the duration of the insecure periods. This is confirmed by our results, which show that, 
beyond current employment status, the accumulation of unemployment spells and non-
permanent employment is likely to decrease the likelihood of entry into parenthood for 
men (specification 3, Table 2). Thus men who face either persistent or recurrent 
unemployment experience slower transition to first birth. For women, confirming the 
previous result, only the accumulation of non-permanent employment is likely to have a 
negative effect.  
 
                                                          
22 Other specifications including both partners’ professional situations (since this information was available in 
the survey) have been performed, and the results are similar.  
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Table 2: Semi-parametric duration model (Cox) on the interval between 
partnership formation and first child: different specifications of 
employment status 
  MEN 
Hazard ratio Aged 20-49 
Specification 1 2 3 4 
Respondent's employment status   
  last year (TV) at the beginning 
of partnership 
ratios (TV) last year (TV)+ 
unemployment 
rate (TV) 
Working ref ref  ref 
Unemployed 0.756** 0.959  0.763** 
Short-term employment 0.849*   0.863* 
Student 0.610*** 0.794***  0.609*** 
Homemaker      
Ratios      
Unemployment    0.741*  
Short-term employment   0.768***  
Unemployment rate    
Overall by sex (aged 15-64)  0.955*** 
N 3510 3510 3510 3510 
Events 2401 2401 2401 2401 
 WOMEN 
Hazard ratio Aged 20-49 
Specification 1 2 3 4 
Respondent's employment status   
 last year (TV) at the beginning 
of partnership 
ratios (TV) last year (TV)+ 
unemployment 
rate (TV) 
Working ref ref  ref 
Unemployed 1.028 0.901  1.046 
Short-term employment 0.819***   0.824*** 
Student 0.534*** 0.774***  0.546*** 
Homemaker  1.340*** 1.480***  1.376*** 
Ratios      
Unemployment    1.106  
Short-term employment   0.723***  
Unemployment rate     
Overall by sex (aged 15-64)   0.933*** 
N 4338 4338 4338 4338 
Events 3244 3244 3244 3244 
 
TV= Time-varying 
*, **, *** significant at 0.01, at 0.05, at 0.001 
Controlled for religiosity, type of union (TV), education, number of siblings, age at first partnership, cohort. 
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5.3 Employment uncertainty and educational level 
One can argue that unemployment is not significant for women because they form a 
heterogeneous group, with career prospects that differ according to their educational 
level. As expected, birth timing varies significantly by level of education (Table A2). 
Having no qualifications or a basic education accelerates the timing of a first child for 
both men and women, while having a university degree (or a secondary level of 
education for women only) postpones fertility with respect to less qualified people. This 
postponing effect of education is particularly strong for women. This result is quite 
standard: in France, as elsewhere, the more educated people remain childless for longer. 
The reasons are multiple: the opportunity cost of having children is higher for the 
highly educated, especially for women. They thus may wait to get sufficient returns 
from their educational investment before becoming a parent.  
As Table 3 shows, highly educated women, assumed to be more career-oriented, 
do not behave differently from low educated women when they face unemployment. 
They do not postpone childbearing when they are unemployed, which does not validate 
our third hypothesis. However, highly educated women tend to delay transition to 
motherhood when they hold an insecure job. This is not the case for low educated 
women in the same situation, who might be discouraged workers. Hence, only the more 
career-oriented women in short term employment postpone their childbearing.  
For men, the unemployment effect differs by educational level: being unemployed 
delays the first birth only for low educated men. There is no effect for more educated 
men.23 This result is not consistent with the lower income effect and lower career 
prospects for less educated men. However, for low educated men getting a job may be 
more important for gaining social status, this status effect being higher than the 
opportunity cost effect. With regard to short-term employment, highly educated men 
appear to be more cautious and wait longer before having a first child. For highly 
educated men, stable employment rather than short-term employment may be a way for 
them to assume their breadwinner role. 
 
                                                          
23 However the number of cases in this category is small, particularly in the 1980s.  
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Table 3: Interaction between uncertainty (t-1) and education  
 Men Women 
Respondent’s employment status in year t-1 (TV)   
Long-term employment ref ref 
Unemployed*high educated 0.832 0.891 
Unemployed*low educated 0.724** 1.033 
Short-term*high educated 0.676*** 0.696*** 
Short-term*low educated 0.933 0.941 
Student 0.604*** 0.382*** 
Homemaker  2.169*** 
Education (ref= low educated)   
High educated  0.881*** 0.925 
 
TV= Time-varying 
***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, 10% 
Controlled for type of union (time varying), belonging to a large family (number of siblings=2+), religiosity, age at first partnership, 
immigration status and birth cohort.  
 
 
5.4 Aggregate unemployment reduces transition to parenthood 
We assumed that individual fertility might be influenced by the general situation of the 
labour market. More precisely, we stated that the higher the aggregate unemployment 
rate, the longer people wait before having a child (H4). In addition to individual 
employment characteristics, the unfavourable general situation of the French labour 
market, measured by the national unemployment rate (ages 15-64) by sex, is an 
additional reason for postponing the first child (specification 4, Table 2). Men and 
women’s aggregate unemployment is negatively associated with the transition to 
fatherhood and motherhood, respectively. This aggregate effect is even larger for 
women. Thus it appears clearly that the timing of fertility is sensitive to general 
economic circumstances. An alternative specification (not shown here) using age 
brackets (unemployment rate below 5%, between 5% and 8%, 8% and above) aims to 
test some possible threshold effects. The negative relationship with unemployment rate 
increases steadily, showing no threshold effect. Moreover, to account more accurately 
for possible period effects, two additional alternative specifications were tested. First, 
the general unemployment rate by sex is replaced by age-specific (five-year groups) 
unemployment rate by sex. The results have the same significance but the parameter 
effect is slightly weaker. Second, the specification introduces five-year time series 
(dummies) to account for the possible period effects.  The results of unemployment rate 
are very similar (-0.054 for men and -0.074 for women). Whatever the specification, 
once the aggregate unemployment rate is introduced the effect of individual 
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employment status remains. Thus, both micro and macro situations appear to interact 
with fertility decisions.  
 
 
5.5 Completed fertility depends on the accumulation of uncertainty for men 
Finally, we turn to our fifth hypothesis regarding the long-term implications of 
employment uncertainty. Figure 6 presents the total number of children by age 40 
according to individual employment history, for men and women respectively. The 
distribution of men and women by their number of children is displayed for those who 
had never been unemployed since the start of their first partnership, for those who were 
unemployed between one year and 10% of years, and for those who were unemployed 
more than 10% of years. This figure suggests that for women the distribution by 
number of children is very similar, whatever their unemployment history. Hence, for 
women this result suggests that unemployment neither prevents nor encourages 
childbearing.  
For men, on the other hand, the number of children varies a great deal with 
unemployment history. Men who have experienced several unemployment spells and 
have been jobless for more than one year out of ten are more than twice as likely to 
remain childless and less likely to have two children or more. Thus these descriptive 
statistics suggest that the probability of having children for men is lower when the 
number of unemployment spells increases. 
There are less marked differences in the total number of children at age 40 
according to the experience of short-term employment. For women, those who have 
experienced insecure employment have large families slightly more often (three 
children and more). But those who have faced recurrent spells of insecure employment 
(10% and more) are also childless slightly more often. Men with long periods in 
insecure employment also have 3 children and more more often.  
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Figure 5: Number of children by frequency of unemployment /short-term 
employment 
Unemployment
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0 1 2 3 4 and more 
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0%
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80%
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Men Women
0 1 2 3 4 and more  
 
Source: EFE, INED, 2004-2005 
Sample: Women and men born before 1965 having lived at least one partnership 
 
The multivariate analysis shows that, for men, these observed differences in the 
final number of children by degree of exposure to unemployment or short-term 
employment are not simply linked to structural characteristics, such as family 
background or level of education, which could be connected with the experience of 
insecure employment (Table 4). Indeed, the ratio of unemployment is significantly 
negative for men: the longer they have been unemployed, the fewer children they have 
at age 40 (specification 1, Table 4). Specification 2 shows that completed fertility is 
affected only for men who experience lasting unemployment over the life course (over 
10% of time since union formation up to age 40). On the other hand, the ratio related to 
short-term employment is significantly positive, especially for those who experience 
short-term employment for several years (specification 2). Controlling for education, 
religiosity, immigrant status, and other family background, the longer the relative time 
in insecure employment, the higher the number of children. This result is rather 
puzzling since having experienced short-term employment was not significant in the 
timing of the first birth.24 Moreover, insecure employment was quite rare for the cohort 
born before 1964. Thus those who have experienced recurrent periods of insecure 
employment in this cohort are clearly highly selected. Descriptive statistics show that 
they are less educated, more likely to be manual workers and immigrants, and often 
entered their first union before age 20. To check whether this result is linked with a 
more general precariousness or poverty, we perform a third estimation including the 
social group as additional covariate (specification 3, Table 4). The social group was not 
significant; a quite standard result in France where there is little social segregation of 
fertility, and the coefficient for insecure employment remains significant. 
                                                          
24 It is even not significant when we performed the Cox model on this birth cohort (table not shown here).  
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Unfortunately, the dataset contains very little retrospective economic information to 
check this explanation further. For now we can explain this result by making two 
assumptions. First, having a large family may be a signal of social success that 
compensates for chronic difficulties in the labour market. Second, uncertainty in the 
labour market may be correlated with uncertainty in others fields of life, such as lower 
use of contraception, which might explain more unwanted births. For women, neither 
the ratio of unemployment nor the ratio of short-term employment is significant for the 
number of children reached at age 40. Thus having experienced unemployment and/or 
short-term employment is not likely to affect their completed fertility. This result holds 
for the cohorts born before 1964, for whom short-term employment was quite rare.  
Our fifth hypothesis is validated, but only for men, i.e., there is an impact of 
unemployment on completed fertility for people with a long duration of unemployment. 
It is the only case for which the fertility quantum is affected.  
 
Table 4: Ordered polytomic model on the number of children at age 40 
 Men Women 
Model 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Ratio unemployment -1.029***  -1.053*** -0.072  -0.014 
  (0.315)  (0.316) (0.235)  (0.237) 
Ratio short-term employment 0.508**  0.495** 0.185  0.149 
  (0.227)  (0.228) (0.208)  (0.209) 
Ratio unemployment (ref=0%)         
between 0 and 10%   -0.009    -0.051  
    (0.107)    (0.079)  
>10%   -0.218**    -0.023  
    (0.100)    (0.072)  
Ratio short-term employment (ref=0%)         
between 0 and 10%   0.096    0.037  
    (0.102)    (0.082)  
>10%   0.220**    0.096  
    (0.096)    (0.078)  
Large family 0.221*** 0.211*** 0.236*** 0.252*** 0.255*** 0.266*** 
  (0.065) (0.064) (0.065) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) 
Religiosity (ref=moderately important)         
important 0.272*** 0.271*** 0.267*** 0.225*** 0.222*** 0.218*** 
  (0.067) (0.066) (0.067) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) 
unimportant -0.202 -0.203 -0.209* -0.047 -0.043 -0.037 
  (0.125) (0.125) (0.126) (0.118) (0.118) (0.120) 
Immigration status (ref=native)         
Second generation  0.058 0.061 0.038 -0.142 -0.140 -0.148 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) 
Immigrant 0.214** 0.166* 0.194* 0.374*** 0.375*** 0.324*** 
  (0.099) (0.097) (0.100) (0.090) (0.090) (0.092) 
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Table 4: (Continued) 
 Men Women 
Model 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Number of years of marital live  0.086*** 0.092*** 0.087*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
At least 2 partnerships (ref=1) -0.041 -0.040 -0.034 0.079 0.082 0.090 
  (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) 
Married 0.324*** 0.330*** 0.324*** 0.523*** 0.532*** 0.521*** 
  (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) 
Education (ref=low)         
high 0.217*** 0.219*** 0.265*** 0.099 0.094 0.106 
  (0.069) (0.069) (0.087) (0.067) (0.068) (0.086) 
medium 0.105 0.093 0.146 0.102 0.097 0.112 
  (0.092) (0.092) (0.097) (0.073) (0.073) (0.077) 
no qualifications 0.306*** 0.301*** 0.294*** 0.338*** 0.337*** 0.303*** 
  (0.087) (0.087) (0.089) (0.075) (0.075) (0.077) 
Socio-occupational category (ref= clerk)        
Farmer/ self-employed    -0.016   -0.006 
     (0.114)   (0.120) 
Higher-level occupation    -0.058   -0.017 
     (0.119)   (0.108) 
Intermediate  occupation    -0.136   0.013 
     (0.103)   (0.076) 
Manual worker    -0.009   0.004 
     (0.098)   (0.087) 
Always inactive        0.530*** 
           (0.157) 
Cut 1 0.439*** 0.547*** 0.422*** 0.514*** 0.532*** 0.523*** 
  (0.121) (0.118) (0.143) (0.128) (0.127) (0.129) 
Cut 2 1.280*** 1.375*** 1.264*** 1.441*** 1.457*** 1.447*** 
  (0.123) (0.121) (0.145) (0.129) (0.129) (0.131) 
Cut 3 2.463*** 2.557*** 2.449*** 2.723*** 2.739*** 2.730*** 
  (0.129) (0.127) (0.151) (0.136) (0.136) (0.138) 
Cut 4 3.488*** 3.584*** 3.479*** 3.693*** 3.710*** 3.702*** 
  (0.139) (0.137) (0.159) (0.143) (0.143) (0.145) 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09 
Observations 1,533 1,533 1,512 1,771 1,771 1,747 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Standard errors in parentheses 
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6. Discussion and conclusion  
One of the main aims of this paper was to examine gender differences in the effect of 
employment uncertainty on childbearing. The examination of fertility timing and 
completed fertility in France demonstrates that employment uncertainty affects timing 
rather than quantum, and matters in different ways for men and women.  
Fertility is lower when men experience unemployment. Facing unemployment 
significantly influences the timing of first childbearing: men who were unemployed one 
year previously are likely to postpone the arrival of the first child. This result reflects 
the fact that, for men, it is important to get a job before becoming a father. However, 
being unemployed at partnership formation does not act on the timing of the first child. 
It thus seems that when partners have accepted an unstable employment situation and 
are thus prepared for it, childbearing timing is not affected, while unanticipated changes 
in economic circumstances do influence the birth of children. Moreover, menthatface 
persistent unemployment or an accumulation of periods of unemployment delay the 
transition to the first child for much longer than others. For the men who encountered 
persistent or recurrent unemployment, and only for them, quantum is likely to be 
reduced at the age of 40. Postponement generally has no persistent effect except for 
men with chaotic careers. However, one cannot exclude the possibility that such men 
also have unstable partnerships and that unobserved factors may explain their lower 
level of fertility.  
In contrast to men, women’s unemployment has no effect on their fertility. Neither 
being unemployed at partnership formation, nor current unemployment during 
partnership, nor the accumulation of unemployment spells, have an effect either on the 
timing of fertility or on completed fertility at age 40. The income effect of losing one’s 
job appears to be counterbalanced by the price effect, as in the US (Rindfuss, Morgan 
and Swicegood. 1988). Women neither take the opportunity of unemployment to 
accelerate the arrival of their first child, as has been observed in Germany and the 
United Kingdom (Kravdal 1994, 2002; Hoem 2000; Andersson 2000), nor do they 
postpone childbearing compared to women in employment, as they do in Belgian 
Flanders (Impens 1989).Our results contrast with the findings of a comparative French 
survey performed in 1997, which showed that women who face unemployment 
postpone fertility. This difference is explained by divergence in methodology: our study 
uses time-varying variables for employment status, unlike their research which used 
static dummy variables indicating whether unemployment was experienced before or 
after union formation. When we use such indicators, comparable results are found, i.e. 
women having experienced unemployment after partnership significantly postpone 
childbearing. But as the authors themselves pointed out, such types of indicators are of 
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limited value since the longer the time since union formation, the higher the likelihood 
of encountering unemployment.  
This insignificant effect of unemployment for women holds true whatever their 
level of education. Contrary to what has been observed in Germany (Kreyenfeld 2005) 
or in Sweden (Hoem 2000), there is no heterogeneity of women, at least by educational 
level, regarding the impact of unemployment on fertility, which confirms previous 
results (Ekert et al. 2002). 
Although women’s individual unemployment does not affect fertility, women 
seem to be highly sensitive to the general labour market situation, since women’s 
aggregate unemployment reduces transition to motherhood. This result also holds true 
for men, even though macro-level effects are more important for women. Thus women 
seem to be more sensitive to a pessimistic perception of future job prospects that may 
affect one or both partners, than to their current adverse personal situation. All women, 
and not only those who face unemployment, postpone fertility in bad times.  
Precarious employment is clearly a different type of employment uncertainty 
Again, contrasting results are found for men and women. Such types of employment 
seem to have a low impact on the transition to fatherhood, except when men are 
affected by uncertainty over many years, which signals huge difficulties in entering the 
stable segment of the labour market. For women, on the other hand, insecure 
employment is more likely to influence fertility: being in short-term employment 
twelve months earlier leads to the postponement of motherhood, as does the 
accumulation of non-permanent contracts. This is particularly true for more educated 
women who have career expectations. Holding a permanent position before pregnancy 
guarantees that they can return to work after the birth of the child. It also allows them to 
accumulate enough work experience to claim parental leave benefits.  
This contrasting influence of unemployment for men and women is not unique to 
France. It has been observed in Europe (Adsera 2005b), Norway (Kravdal 2002), and 
the US (Rindfuss, Morgan and Swicegood 1988). It illustrates how the social roles of 
men and women continue to differ in France: men are still expected to be the main 
breadwinner and have to secure economic resources before having children. These 
results show again that work is the central pillar of male identity, and also of paternal 
identity. Men seem more destabilized by unemployment than women. They need to find 
a place in the world of work to restore their social status and their role as resource 
provider before considering fatherhood. The breadwinner model assigned to men is still 
dominant. For women, the results are less clear-cut, since for them the decision to have 
children is more complex: they must balance two careers, that of mother and of worker. 
These results also reflect the gendered structure of the labour market and the unequal 
opportunities for men and women. The decision to have a child is not independent of its 
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effects: women suffer the negative impact of childbearing on employment, and in terms 
of division of labour within the household. 
Finally, the impact of employment insecurity on fertility seems to be rather low in 
France since it affects mainly the tempo, and only marginally the quantum. The 
postponement of the first birth caused by employment uncertainty appears to be 
recovered later. Several explanations of this finding may be advanced. First, the 
transition most sensitive to economic circumstances remains family formation, with the 
arrival of the first child. No effect is generally found for the second birth (Pailhé and 
Solaz 2010). In France, the two-child family is a strong social norm. The strong wish to 
give a brother or a sister to the first child may counter-balance the negative effect of 
employment uncertainty that may have delayed the first birth. Moreover, the couples 
are older and postponement of further children may appear riskier since fecundity 
decreases with age. More generally, in France those who have postponed the first child 
– such as the more educated or the youngest cohorts – accelerate the arrival of the 
second child to conform to this social norm of the two-child family. Second, public 
transfers may serve as a guarantee, since cash transfers to families increase significantly 
with the second child in France. People who are unemployed or in insecure employment 
may also feel more confident about the future when having children. Third, achieving 
parental status reduces the negative effect of unemployment. People are more likely to 
be better integrated in social networks when they are parents. Moreover, unemployed 
fathers may have better chances of finding a job, since being a father provides a positive 
signal to employers of an applicant’s commitment to work (François 1998). Last, in a 
life course perspective, the duration of exposure to unemployment is relatively short 
compared to that of childbearing, so people have enough time to catch up on their 
delay. Our results emphasise the need for indicators of both tempo and quantum, 
especially in a context of postponed and late fertility. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Sample description 
Frequencies Whole sample Aged 40+ 
  men women men women 
Dependent variables         
Number of children at age 40 (mean)     1.95 2.15 
Having a first child 68.4 74.8 79.7 85.6 
       
Covariates         
Respondent employment  status:         
At the beginning of partnership     
employed 81.2 62.3 87.7 70.5 
(of which short-term employment) (6.8) (7.2) (4.8) (4.6) 
unemployment 5.0 6.3 3.6 5.0 
in education 13.8 19.2 8.7 10.3 
homemaker   12.2   14.1 
     
Year T-11     
Employed 74.6 57.8 80.9 66.1 
short-term employment 8.9 10.9 5.5 6.7 
unemployment 3.7 6.5 3.4 5.3 
in education 12.8 14.0 10.2 9.1 
homemaker   10.8   12.8 
Ratio of unemployment1 3.8 7.0     
Ratio of short-term employment1 9.7 11.8     
Life-cycle ratio of unemployment     
never     82.8 70.0 
less than 10%      7.4 13.1 
10% and more     9.8 16.9 
Life-cycle ratio of short-term employment     
never     81.2 74.3 
less than 10%      8.2 11.6 
10% and more     10.6 14.1 
Unemployment rate (15-64) by sex1 7.0 10.2     
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Table A1: (Continued) 
Frequencies Whole sample Aged 40+ 
  men women men women 
Other covariates         
Cohabiting couple1 8.7 12.3 14.8 20.5 
Large family (ref=no) 67.2 67.5 75.2 73.2 
Religiosity     
important 21.1 29.8 24.0 33.3 
little importance 73.4 66.3 70.9 61.7 
not important 5.5 3.9 5.1 5.0 
Immigration status     
native 82.1 82.0 81.3 82.4 
second generation immigrant 8.4 8.1 9.1 7.6 
immigrant 9.5 9.9 9.6 10.0 
Age at first union     
<20 17.9 40.9 54.4 39.6 
20-25 55.8 45.2 30.9 16.2 
after 25 26.3 13.9 14.7 44.2 
Birth cohort     
before 1964 43.7 40.8 100 100 
1964-1973 40.8 40.4     
after 1973 15.5 18.8     
Education level     
no qualifications 11.7 13.9 12.7 17.3 
low 45.6 35.4 53.7 42.9 
high 28.3 32.5 22.9 23.2 
medium 14.4 18.2 10.7 16.5 
N 3510 4338 1533 1771 
 
Source: EFE, INED, 2004-2005 
1 time-varying covariate, year-observation frequencies 
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Table A2: Completed results of semi-parametric duration model (Cox) on the 
timing between first partnership and first child (specification 2)  
Hazard-ratios Men Women 
Situation t-1 (ref=stable job)     
unemployment 0.756** 1.028 
short-term employment 0.849* 0.819*** 
student 0.610*** 0.534*** 
homemaker   1.340*** 
Married (ref=no) 1.187** 1.221*** 
Large family (ref=no) 1.158*** 1.107** 
Religiosity (ref=Religion moderately important)     
Religion important 1.189*** 1.072* 
Religion unimportant 0.930 0.955 
Immigration status (ref=native)     
second generation 1.126 1.042 
immigrant 1.140*** 1.075 
Age at first union (ref=after 25)     
<20 0.871* 0.976 
20-25 1.040*** 1.026 
Birth cohort (ref= before 1964)     
after 1973 0.726*** 0.804*** 
1964-1973 0.942 0.931* 
Education (ref=low)     
high 0.887** 0.814*** 
medium 0.967 0.918* 
no qualifications 1.123* 1.125** 
N  3510 4338 
 
Source: EFE, INED, 2004-2005 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
